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Unpicking	complex	incentive	mechanisms	that	reward
top	managers	handsomely
One	distinct	feature	of	the	rise	in	income	inequality	over	recent	decades	is	the	surging	incomes	of	the	working	rich,
particularly	the	pay	of	a	class	of	top	managers.	A	popular	view	stresses	the	role	of	performance-related	pay	in
generating	this	feature.	According	to	this	view,	the	pay	of	many	top	managers	is	high-powered	(i.e.,	with	incentives
tied	to	firm	performance).	In	good	times,	the	managerial	pay	is	boosted	by	firm	profits,	while	in	bad	times,	top
managers	are	barely	punished	because	of	limited	liability.	Such	an	incentive	structure	generates	excess	pay	to	top
managers,	dwarfing	the	pay	to	salaried	workers.
However,	reality	is	more	complex	than	the	above	view.	Neither	a	high-powered	incentive	nor	a	managerial	job
guarantees	a	high	level	of	pay.	An	obvious	example	is	owners	of	small	businesses	such	as	farms,	grocery	stores,
laundry	shops,	and	local	bakeries.	They	are	residual	claimants—who	claim	on	a	firm’s	net	cash	flows	after	the
deduction	of	precedent	agents’	claims.	Thus,	their	income	is	entirely	tied	to	firm	performance	and	extremely	high-
powered;	yet	they	earn	less	than	an	average	mid-level	manager.	The	U.S.	Occupational	Survey	data	show	that
among	production	workers,	the	ones	paid	by	time	earn	$15.77	per	hour	while	the	ones	paid	by	incentives	earn
$16.03;	the	wage	difference	between	these	two	types	of	workers	among	clerical	and	administrative	workers	is	even
smaller.
The	following	figure	plots	the	managerial	wage	premium	—	defined	as	the	difference	in	the	annual	real	(CPI-
adjusted)	wages	between	managers	and	production/clerical	workers	—	over	the	1997-2014	period	in	the	US.	The
wage	premium	for	salaried	managers	rises	from	approximately	US$	20,000	in	the	1990s	to	more	than	US$	30,000	in
the	2010s.	The	premium	for	top	managers	(CEOs	and	general	managers)	more	than	doubles	during	the	sample
period,	whereas	the	premium	for	mid-level	managers	(division	managers	and	plant	managers)	rises	far	more
modestly.	Isolating	low-level	managers	(first-line	supervisors	and	administrative	managers)	shows	that	their	wage
premium	barely	changes	over	time.
Figure	1.	Differences	in	real	wages	from	1997	to	2014
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Data	source:	US.	National	Occupational	Compensation	Statistics,	U.S.	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics.
To	explain	the	above	data	pattern	and	address	the	debate	regarding	how	a	high-powered	incentive	structure	drives
increasing	wage	inequality,	two	basic	economic	questions	need	to	be	answered.	The	first	question	concerns	how
various	pay	structures	emerge	from	firm	management	and	market	competition.	The	second	concerns	to	what	extent
the	use	of	incentive	pay	causes	a	trade-off	between	efficiency	and	inequality.
To	address	these	questions,	I	develop	a	theory	that	links	worker	ability,	pay-performance	sensitivity,	and	pay	level
across	a	wide	range	of	jobs.	The	aim	of	the	theory	is	twofold.	First,	in	the	market,	it	aims	to	efficiently	match
individuals	with	different	managerial	ability	to	owners	of	productive	assets.	Second,	within	firms,	owners	aim	to
mitigate	moral	hazard	or	managerial	slack	by	designing	optimal	pay	contracts.	The	key	contractual	constraint	facing
firm	owners	is	limited	liability	in	the	sense	that	a	firm	cannot	punish	its	manager	beyond	a	certain	limit	even	when	the
manager	fails	to	improve	the	firm’s	profitability.
Under	the	limited-liability	constraint,	three	pay	contracts	can	be	used	to	elicit	managerial	effort.	Without	limited
liability,	an	owner	can	transfer	the	ownership	of	the	firm	to	the	manager	who	then	becomes	a	residual	claimant.	This
contract	achieves	the	first-best	efficiency,	but	under	the	limited-liability	constraint,	it	is	only	feasible	when	firm	size
(determined	by	managerial	talent	in	the	first	place)	is	sufficiently	small	so	that	the	manager	can	buy	it	upfront	with	his
or	her	future	income.
When	firm	size	is	too	big	to	permit	ownership	transfer,	providing	incentives	to	managers	involves	a	structure	of
contingent	pay	and	requires	a	cost	of	paying	above	managers’	outside	options.	However,	for	a	medium-talent
manager,	the	value	of	managerial	effort	is	not	sufficient	to	outweigh	the	cost	of	providing	a	high	level	of	incentive.
Thus,	the	owner	optimally	uses	a	contingent-pay	structure	tied	to	the	manager’s	outside	option.	This	type	of	contract
is	relatively	low	cost	and	has	modest	benefits.	By	contrast,	a	high-talent	manager	creates	a	sufficient	surplus	such
that	the	owner	is	willing	to	offer	a	part	of	firm	profit	to	managers.	Such	a	profit-sharing	contract	incurs	a	high	cost	but
has	a	large	benefit.
The	solution	to	the	managerial	problem	within	firms	and	the	matching	problem	in	the	market	generates	a	pattern	that
sorts	individuals	–	on	the	basis	of	managerial	ability	–	into	three	types	of	employment	status:	production	workers,
small	business	owners,	and	salaried	managers,	corresponding	to	three	basic	types	of	incentive	contracts:	fixed
salary,	residual	claim,	and	contingent	pay.	As	a	result	of	this	sorting	pattern,	a	range	of	less-talented	individuals	with
different	abilities	is	rewarded	by	different	incentive	structures	but	receives	a	similar	level	of	pay.	An	alignment
between	incentive	structure	and	pay	level	occurs	only	to	high-talent	managers,	who	manage	large	businesses	and
also	share	their	employers’	profits.
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The	theory	posits	a	trade-off	between	wage	inequality	and	economic	efficiency.	Changes	in	technology	and	market
conditions	that	improve	economic	efficiency	inevitably	increase	wage	inequality.	In	particular,	productivity-enhancing
technological	progress	causes	disproportionate	growth	in	firm	size,	favouring	more-productive	firms.	Thus,
technological	progress	increases	the	value	of	managerial	efforts	in	big	firms.
This	induces	resources	to	be	reallocated	from	small	firms	(run	by	low-talent	managers)	to	big	firms	(run	by	high-
talent	managers).	In	consequence,	three	effects	occur:	(1)	a	shrinking	fraction	of	small	business	owners	in	the
managerial	occupation,	(2)	an	expanding	fraction	of	high-talent	managers	who	share	firm	profits,	and	(3)	an	increase
in	the	level	of	incentives	offered	to	managers.	These	three	effects	jointly	contribute	to	a	highly	skewed	wage
distribution	in	favour	of	top	talent.
Similarly,	the	theory	predicts	that	product	competition	contributes	to	a	highly	skewed	wage	distribution.	This	is
because	stiffer	competition	triggers	production	factors	to	be	reallocated	from	smaller	to	larger	firms.	As	a	result,
larger	firms	offer	greater	incentives	to	their	managers	while	smaller	firms	and	less-talented	managers	exit	the	market.
Thus,	both	efficiency	and	inequality	increase.	This	prediction	has	implications	for	policies	regarding	international
trade.	For	instance,	an	economic	sector	that	is	subject	to	more	intense	import	competition	should	witness	greater
income	inequalities	among	workers.
Is	it	possible	to	obtain	more	efficiency	and	less	inequality	at	the	same	time?	According	to	the	theory,	one	such
possibility	is	to	enhance	managerial	liability,	that	is,	to	permit	firms	to	punish	managers	when	they	fail	to	improve	firm
profitability.	In	this	way,	a	firm	can	align	managerial	incentive	with	its	objective	without	giving	away	too	much	rent	to
its	manager.	Then,	economic	efficiency	is	improved,	firms	keep	most	surplus,	and	managers’	wages	are	largely
disciplined	by	their	outside	options.
♣♣♣
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